We prove that there is no black-box construction of a threshold predicate encryption system from identity-based encryption. Our result signifies nontrivial progress in a line of research suggested by Boneh, Sahai and Waters (TCC '11), where they proposed a study of the relative power of predicate encryption for different functionalities. We rely on and extend the techniques of Boneh et al. (FOCS '08), where they give a black-box separation of identity-based encryption from trapdoor permutations.
Introduction
An encryption scheme enables a user to securely share data with other users. Traditional methods based on Secret-Key Cryptography and Public-Key Cryptography consider the scenarios where a user securely shares data with another fixed user whose identity (characterized by the possession of the decryption-key) it knows in advance. In particular, in these schemes, there is a bijection between the encryption-key and the decryption-key, fixed by the chosen encryption scheme.
As systems and networks grow in complexity, and in particular with the emergence of the cloud computing, the above viewpoint may be too narrow to cover many important applications. Often, a user might want to encrypt data to be shared with a large set of other users based on some common "property", or attribute, they satisfy. Membership in this set may not be known to the encryptor, or may not even be decidable in advance. Furthermore, a user might want to share data selectively so different users are able to decrypt different parts of that data. To cater to these scenarios, the notion of Predicate Encryption (or Attribute-based Encryption) has recently emerged. Predicate encryption was introduced by Sahai and Waters [34] , and further developed in the work of Goyal et al. [19] . It has been the subject of several recent works, e.g., [1, 12, 13, 21, 26, 30, 31] . Predicate encryption is useful in a wide variety of applications; in particular, for fine-grained access control. It has also been a useful technical tool in solving seemingly unrelated problems, e.g., key escrow [18] and user revocation [7] in Identity-based Encryption (IBE). IBE [10, 14, 35] can be seen as the most basic form of a predicate encryption, where the predicate corresponds to a point function.
A predicate encryption scheme is defined in terms of a family F of Boolean functions (predicates) on a universe A of attributes. Decryption-keys are associated to a predicate f ∈ F and ciphertexts are labeled with (or are created based on) an attribute string a ∈ A. A user with a decryption-key corresponding to f can decrypt a ciphertext labeled with x if and only if f (x) = 1. As argued by Boneh et al. [12] , the key challenge in the study of predicate encryption (or Functional Encryption in general) is understanding what classes of functionalities F can be supported. If we could support any polynomial time computable predicate f , then any polynomial-time access control program that acts over a user's credentials could be supported [12] .
Unfortunately, the current state of the art is far from being able to support an arbitrary polynomial-time f . Given this, an important direction Boneh et al. [12] suggested was to understand the relative strengths of predicate encryption schemes with respect to the functionalities they can support: When does a scheme for one functionality imply a scheme for another? In the absence of such a reduction, can we prove that predicate encryption for one functionality is inherently harder than for another? A meaningful approach to address this latter question is via black-box separations [20] , see [29, 33] for a comprehensive survey on the topic. A proof that a cryptographic primitive P 1 cannot be constructed given black-box access to another primitive P 2 (and of course without incurring any additional assumptions) can be viewed as an indication that P 1 is in some sense a stronger primitive than P 2 . Hence, to construct P 1 one may have to look for more powerful techniques, or stronger assumptions than for P 2 (or try non-black-box reductions). Thus, studying these questions would help us better understand the extent to which techniques for current predicate encryption systems might or might not be useful in obtaining systems for more general functionalities. The broad goal of this work is to make progress toward answering these questions.
Since a predicate encryption scheme has an associated family F of Boolean functions, a natural way to classify them is according to the complexity class this family comes from. For example, we can call a scheme (A, F) an AC 0 -PE scheme, if every member of F can be computed by a constant-depth polynomial size circuit (an AC 0 circuit) on an attribute string from A. Hence, a concrete approach to compare predicate encryption schemes is to ask questions of the kind: Given a predicate encryption scheme for predicates in complexity class G, can we construct a scheme for predicates in a (potentially larger) complexity class F in a black-box way? For example, it is well-known that the circuit class NC 1 is strictly larger than AC 0 . Thus a concrete question is: Is NC 1 -predicate encryption provably harder than AC 0 -predicate encryption with respect to black-box reductions? A second aspect of our work is to try to relate (perhaps conjectured) separations among Boolean function complexity classes to black-box separations among the corresponding predicate encryption schemes.
Our Results
Our main result is a black-box separation of threshold predicate encryption (TPE) from identitybased encryption (IBE) schemes. To our knowledge, this is the first result on the impossibility of constructing a cryptographic primitive from IBE. Recall that IBE can be viewed as the most basic form of predicate encryption in which the decryption tests exact equality (in other words, the predicate is a point function). Hence, the first natural step in the study of the above question is whether IBE can be used to construct more general predicate encryption systems. Our results show that IBE cannot be used to construct even a basic system for threshold predicates (introduced by Sahai and Waters [34] ). We believe that the question of IBE vs. more advanced predicate encryption systems is of special interest. IBE as a primitive is very well studied [8-10, 14, 17, 36] , and constructions of IBE are now known based on a variety of hardness assumptions.
Returning to our more general question, we rule out certain "natural" black-box constructions of predicate encryption for the class NC 1 from predicate encryption for the class AC 0 , assuming a widely believed conjecture in the area of two-party communication complexity. Given blackbox access to a predicate encryption scheme for (B, G), a natural way to construct a predicate encryption scheme for a "larger" system (A, F) using a a Sharing-Based Construction is as follows. The decryption-key for an f ∈ F is simply the set of decryption keys for a set S(f ) = {g 1 , . . . , g q } of predicates g i ∈ G from the smaller system. Similarly, for each attribute a ∈ A, we associate a set S(a) = {α 1 , . . . , α q } of attributes from B. To encrypt a message m under attribute a for the big system, we generate q shares m 1 , . . . , m q of m and encrypt m j under attribute α j of the small system. The concatenation of these encrypted shares is the ciphertext of m under a. To decrypt, we try to decrypt each m j using the decryption keys of each g i ∈ S(f ). The sharing construction ensures that the shares m j that are successfully decrypted, if any, in this process suffice to recover m. Thus the sharing-based construction is a rather natural and obvious way to build predicate encryption schemes for more complex functionalities from simpler ones. Our result shows that such a sharing-based construction is impossible if F is a family of functions in NC 1 and G is any family of functions from AC 0 , assuming certain conjectures in communication complexity. It is worth noting that combinatorial arguments about sharing-based constructions form a core component of our main result on (unrestricted) black-box separation of TPE from IBE.
Techniques
We build upon and extend the techniques of Boneh et al. [11] which rule out black-box construction of IBE from Trapdoor Permutations (TDP). Along the way, we also simplify several aspects of their proof. Given a black-box construction of TPE from IBE, our proof proceeds by designing an attack on TPE which succeeds with high probability (in fact arbitrarily close to the completeness probability of the purported TPE scheme). Somewhat more formally, we build an oracle O relative to which a CCA secure IBE exists, but any purported construction of a TPE relative to this oracle is insecure.
Our analysis of the attack roughly consists of a combinatorial part and a cryptographic part. The combinatorial aspect of our analysis is new and completely different from that in [11] . While the cryptographic part is similar in structure to that of [11] , we do make several crucial modifications that makes our attack simpler and analysis cleaner.
A Comparison of the Combinatorial Aspects. At the heart of the proof of [11] is a combinatorial argument as follows. An IBE system obtained by a black-box construction from a TDP must embed in its public parameter the public keys of some permutations of the TDP oracle. The adversary's main goal is to collect all the trapdoors corresponding to these permutations. Such trapdoors are embedded in the decryption keys corresponding to identities in the IBE system. The main point is that there are only q = poly(κ) many permutations planted in the public parameters of the IBE, but they must also encode an exponential number of identities. Therefore, if we look at a sufficiently large set of random identities and their secret keys, and encrypt and decrypt a random message under these identities, during at most q of these decryptions we might encounter a "new" trapdoor (which is planted in the public-key to be used during encryption, but was not discovered during other decryptions). It follows, if we choose our identity set S to be of size k · q (and encrypt and decrypt random messages under them), and then choose an identity id $ ← S at random from those q · k identities, then with probability at least 1 − 1/k there is no new (undiscovered) trapdoor left for this identity id. Therefore, whatever is learned during the decryptions of the encryptions of random messages under the identities S \ {id}, is sufficient to decrypt a message encrypted under id without knowing its decryption-key.
This combinatorial argument immediately suggest the following attack. Get decryption-keys for all but a random identity id * chosen from a large enough random set S = id 1 , . . . , id k·q of identities. Collect the trapdoors learned from the encryptions of random messages under the identities in S \ id * , and their decryptions using the corresponding decryption-keys. Try to decrypt the challenge ciphertext C encrypted under the identity id * .
In our case, we have a related but more difficult question: what if we start with a more powerful primitive like an IBE and want to construct another "target" predicate encryption scheme? Now the intuition behind the combinatorial argument of [11] completely breaks down. The reason is that in our new setting, by planting only one (master) public-key of the IBE scheme in the public-key of the target predicate encryption, the encryption algorithm potentially has access to an exponential number of permutations (each indexed by an identity) whose trapdoors can be planted in the decryption-keys. In fact, each decryption-key of the predicate encryption system might have a unique trapdoor (corresponding to a unique identity derived from the description of the predicate). Hence, one can't hope to learn all trapdoors and use them to decrypt the challenge ciphertext. Thus, roughly speaking, by moving from a trapdoor permutation oracle to various forms of PE oracles such as IBE (as the primitive used in the construction), we are allowing the "universe" of trapdoor permutations planted in the public-key and decryption-keys to be exponentially large (rather than some fixed polynomial). The latter difference is the main reason behind the complications in the combinatorial aspect of our problem, because suddenly the regime of positive results becomes much richer, making the job of proving an impossibility result much more challenging.
Our proof relies on the collusion-resistance property of the predicate encryption. The "hope" that an attack exists comes from the following observations:
• The decryption key for each predicate may still consist of only a polynomial number of IBE decryption-keys.
• Each ciphertext is encrypted using a polynomially large set of identities such that a decryptionkey for at least one of these identities is required to decrypt the ciphertext. On the other hand, each ciphertext can be decrypted by keys for an exponential number of different predicates (this follows from the property of a threshold encryption scheme). Call such predicates "related".
• This exponentially large set of related predicates must share an IBE decryption-key since they can decrypt a common ciphertext.
• Our attack works by requesting sufficient number of decryption-keys for related predicates (which would still be unable to decrypt challenge ciphertext). Since related predicates share IBE decryption-keys, the adversary is able to collect all "useful" IBE decryption-keys.
It is not surprising that the above combinatorial arguments sound as though they could already be used to attack sharing based constructions. Indeed, our core combinatorial lemma (Lemma 3.5) is used to refute any sharing-based construction of a TPE from an IBE (Corollary 3.10).
A Comparison of the Cryptographic Aspects. As in [11] , turning the combinatorial analysis into a full-fledged impossibility result requires non-trivial black-box separation machinery. For this reason, even though the combinatorial argument of [11] is relatively simple, the full proof is quite complicated. The explanation for the complexity of such proofs is that one has to handle all possible constructions using a trapdoor permutation oracle (and not just where, for example, a decryption-key simply consists of decryption keys for various identities).
Although the overall structure of our proof is similar to that of [11] , there are several differences in the detailed arguments. In fact, we make some crucial modifications which lead to a more direct attack and cleaner analysis.
The first major modification is that our attacker "directly" learns the heavy queries (following the paradigm of [3, 4] ). In [11] , the attack proceeds by having steps (such as several encryptions of a random bit under the challenge identity, repeating a few steps several times) whose indirect purpose is to learn the heavy queries. Secondly, since we start with an oracle which roughly provides four functionalities (as opposed to the three functionalities of a trapdoor permutation oracle), we need to modify and adapt the techniques of [11] to to new setting Apart from these, there are significant differences in the manner we compare the various experiments which we believe makes the analysis cleaner and more general. The details regarding these can be found in Section 4.1 and beyond.
Preliminaries
Notation. For any probabilistic algorithm A, by y ← A(x) we denote the process of executing A over the input x while using fresh randomness (which we do not represent explicitly) and getting the output y. By a partial oracle we refer to an oracle which is defined only for some of the queries it might be asked. By [x → y] ∈ P we mean that P(x) = y is defined. For a query x and a partial oracle P, we misuse the notation and denote x ∈ P whenever an answer for x is defined in P. By Supp(X) we refer to the support set of the random variable X. For every two random variables X, Y , by ∆(X, Y ) we denote the statistical distance between them. For correlated random variables X and Y , by (X | Y 0 ) we denote the distribution of X conditioned on Y = Y 0 for some Y 0 ∈ Supp(Y ). For a random variable S whose values are sets, we call an element -heavy, if Pr[x ∈ S] ≥ . The view of any probabilistic oracle algorithm A, denoted as View(A) refers to its input, private randomness, and oracle answers (which all together determined the whole execution of A).
Basic Probabilistic Facts
Definition 2.1. For a random variable X = (X 1 , . . . , X k ) consisting of k correlated random variables. For any ∈ [k] we call y = (y 1 , . . . , y ) a prefix sample of length for X if y i ∈ Supp(X i ) for all i ∈ [ ]. We call an event B defined over Supp(X) a prefix event, if there is a set of prefix samples S B for X such that x = (x 1 , . . . , x k ) ∈ B if an only if there exists some y = (y 1 , . . . , y ) ∈ S B which is a prefix of x. For any partial sequence x i = (x 1 , . . . , x i ), i ≤ k we say that the prefix event B happens over x i , and denote it as the Boolean indicator B(x i ), if and only if (x 1 , . . . , x ) ∈ S B for some ≤ i.
The following intuitive lemma can be verified by inspection and is implicit in many works, and here we state it formally. Roughly speaking, this lemma says: if there are two statistical games that proceed almost the same till some "bad" events happen in either of them, then their statistical distance can be bound by the probability of these bad events. 
Predicate Encryption and Its Variants
Definition 2.3 (Predicate Encryption). A predicate encryption scheme PE for the predicate set F κ and attribute set A κ with completeness ρ consists of four probabilistic polynomial time algorithms PE = (G, K, E, D) such that for every predicate f ∈ F, every attribute a ∈ A such that f (a) = 1, and every message M , if we do the following steps, then with probability at least ρ it holds that M = M :
1. Generate a public-key and a master secret-key: (PK, SK) ← G(1 κ ).
2. Get a decryption-key DK f ← K(SK, f ) for the predicate f ∈ F.
3. Encrypt the message M under the attribute a ∈ A and get C ← E(PK, a, M ).
4. Decrypt C using the decryption-key DK f and get M ← D(PK, DK f , C). Definition 2.4 (Neighbor Sets of Predicates and Attributes). For every set of predicates F and f ∈ F, and for every set of attributes A and a ∈ A we define the following terminology:
• deg(f ) = |N (f )| and deg(a) = |N (a)|.
Since we always work with families of algorithms and sets indexed by a security parameter κ, when it is clear from the context we might omit the index κ.
Definition 2.5 (Security of Predicate Encryption). Let PE = (G, K, E, D) be a predicate encryption scheme with the predicate set F and the attribute set A. PE is said to be CPA secure if for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary Adv participating in the experiment below, the probability of Adv correctly outputting the bit b is at most 1/2 + neg(κ):
1. Setup: Generate the keys (PK, SK) ← G(1 κ ) and give PK to Adv.
2.
Query Keys: Adv adaptively queries some predicates f i ∈ F for i = 1, 2, . . . and is given the corresponding decryption-keys
3. Challenge: Adv submits an attribute a ∈ A and a pair of messages M 0 = M 1 of the same length |M 0 | = |M 1 | conditioned on f i (a) = 0 for every predicate f i whose key DK i is acquired by Adv
and is given C ← E(PK, a, M b ) for a randomly selected b
4. Adv continues to query keys for predicates subject to condition (1) and finally outputs a bit.
PE is said to be CCA secure if for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary Adv participating in a modified experiment (explained next), the probability of Adv correctly outputting the bit b is at most 1/2 + neg(κ). The modified experiment proceeds identically as the above experiment, except that after Step 3, Adv is also allowed to adaptively query ciphertexts C i for i = 1, 2, . . . encrypted under the attribute a, with the condition that C i = C for any i, and he is given the decrypted message M ← D(DK f , C i ), where DK f ← K(SK, f ) is a decryption-key for a predicate f such that f (a) = 1.
Comparison with [12] . The work of Boneh et al. [12] calls an attribute an index, calls the message M a payload message, and our predicate f ∈ F here is analogous to their P (k, ·) for a key from the "key space" (which is the same as our predicate set F). Also [12] considers an empty decryption-key that reveals certain information about (a, M ) from E(PK, a, M ) such as the length of M (or maybe the attribute a-in which case the scheme is called public-index ). Definition 2.5 can be deduced from the definition of [12] as a special form of functional encryption when the message length and the attribute is consciously revealed from the encryption, and thus the scheme is public index. Here we do not assume that our schemes are necessarily public index, but we will work with this weaker notion of security. This makes our negative results of Section 4 only stronger, because a stronger security definition tailored for index hiding schemes gives more power to the adversary as follows: Adv is allowed to submit (a 0 , M 0 ), (a 1 , M 1 ) (with potentially different attributes a 0 = a 1 ) such that for every key DK f acquired by him, either it holds that f (a 0 ) = f (a 1 ) = 0 and
Definition 2.6 (Identity-based Encryption [35] ). An Identity Based Encryption scheme is a predicate encryption scheme where (1) the predicate and attribute sets are equal A = F = {0, 1} κ (and are called the set of identities), and (2) for every predicate f ∈ {0, 1} κ and every attribute a ∈ {0, 1} κ we have that f (a) = 1 if and only if f = a.
Definition 2.7 (Threshold Predicate Encryption [34] ). A Threshold Predicate Encryption with threshold 0 < τ < 1 (or simply a τ -TPE) is a predicate encryption where both the predicate and the attribute sets are equal to {0, 1} κ and for any predicate f ∈ {0, 1} κ and any attribute a ∈ {0, 1} κ we have that f (a) = 1 if and only if f, a ≥ τ · κ where f, a is the inner product of the Boolean vectors
The notion of threshold predicate encryption was defined by [34] and is also known as the fuzzy IBE.
Sharing-based Constructions and Impossibility Results
In this section, we describe two intuitive and simple approaches to build a predicated encryption scheme using another predicate encryption scheme as a black-box. It is interesting that the simpler of the two, the OR-based approach turns out to be as powerful as the seemingly more general Sharing-based approach. Even though ruling out constructions using these approaches is a weaker impossibility result than an unrestricted black-box separation (as we will do in Section 4), it seems instructive to refute these natural and general approaches to black-box reductions among predicate encryption schemes. In fact, our proof refuting OR-based constructions of TPE in Section 3.3 forms the combinatorial core of our subsequent proof of a general black-box separation in Section 4. Moreover, the basic approach to building the attack needed in our proof (as well as that in [11] ) of the general black-box separation results seems to benefit by keeping the sharing-based constructions in mind. In Section 3.4, we investigate a new approach to refute sharing-based constructions using (proved or conjectured) separation results in two-party communication complexity. In particular, we can use conjectures in communication complexity to give evidence that NC 1 -predicate encryption is strictly harder than AC 0 -predicate encryption.
The OR-Based Approach
Definition 3.1. Let (F, A) and (G, B) be two pairs of predicate and attribute sets. We call S(·) a q-set system for (F, A) using (G, B) if S is a mapping defined over F ∪ A such that:
1. For every f ∈ F it holds that S(f ) ⊂ G, and for every a ∈ A it holds that S(a) ⊂ B.
For every
Definition 3.2. We say there is an OR-based construction with set-size q for the pair of predicate and attribute sets (F = {f 1 , . . .}, A = {a 1 , . . .}) using another pair (G = {ϕ 1 , . . .}, B = {α 1 , . . .}) if there exists a q-set system S(·) for (F, A) using (G, B) such that the following holds:
We call the OR-based construction efficient if the mapping S(·) is efficiently computable.
Lemma 3.3. Suppose there exists an efficient OR-based construction for (F, A) using (G, B).
Then a secure predicate encryption scheme
with completeness ρ can be constructed (in a black-box way) from any secure predicate encryption scheme
Proof. First we describe how the components of PE 1 work and then will prove its security.
• G 1 (1 κ ): The public-key and master secret-key are sampled as (PK, SK) ← G 2 (1 κ 2 ) (for the right value of the security parameter κ 2 , chosen based on the main security parameter κ).
•
, and finally take
• E 1 (PK, a, m): To get the encryption c ← E 1 (PK, a, M ) for any attribute a ∈ A and message
, and finally take C = (a, C 1 , . . . , C da ).
and look for the lexicographically first pair (i, j) such that ϕ i (α j ) = 1 and output
The ρ-completeness of PE 1 is simply inherited from PE 2 . In what follows we will prove the security of PE 1 . Given an adversary Adv 1 attacking PE 1 and succeeding with probability 1/2 + µ (we call µ the advantage of the adversary), we construct another adversary Adv 2 attacking PE 2 with advantage at least µ/q where q = poly(κ) is the set-size of the set-system S(·). Moreover, if Adv 1 runs in polynomial time, then so does Adv 2 who makes at most q times the number of queries made by Adv 1 . First we consider a security game in which an adversary Adv can submit up to 2k ≤ 2q (rather than two) pairs:
In return Adv will get either the encryptions of (α i , M i 0 ) for all i ∈ [k] or the encryptions of (α i , M i 1 ) for all i, and is supposed to guess which encryptions he gets. We call the latter an extended security game. It can be seen through a standard hybrid argument (cf., Theorem 11.3.1, Chapter 11 of [5] ) that if Adv can have advantage µ in this game, then another adversary Adv can get advantage at least µ /q according to Definition 2.5. Now, we will construct an adversary Adv 2 attacking PE 2 in the extended security game with advantage µ. By the discussion above it can be turned into a standard adversary Adv 2 of advantage µ/q according to Definition 2.5. Adv 2 acts as follows.
• Setup: Adv 2 gets PK and initiates the simulation of Adv 1 by giving PK to it.
• Query: For any query f ∈ F that Adv 1 makes,
then queries all of ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ d f and gets back keys DK 1 , . . . , DK d f , and finally returns
• Challenge: When Adv 1 submits two pairs (a, M 0 ), (a, M 1 ) (satisfying the condition f (a) = 0 for every query f made by
, gets C i , and returns C = (a, C 1 , . . . , C da ) to Adv 1 .
• If Adv 1 makes more queries, then Adv 2 continues answering them as before and finally, Adv 2 outputs whatever bit Adv 1 outputs.
Note that the condition (1) in the challenge phase is satisfied for Adv 2 if it is satisfied for Adv 1 . From Definition 3.2, if for any f ∈ F and a ∈ A f (a) = 0, then for all i
Thus, if f (a) = 0 for every query f made by Adv 1 , then so is true for Adv 2 , i.e., ϕ(α 1 ) = · · · = ϕ(α da ) = 0 for every query ϕ made by Adv 2 . Now, it is easy to see that Adv 2 is correctly simulating the experiment for Adv 1 and therefore achieves the same advantage µ.
The Sharing-Based Approach
Clearly, the OR-based construction of Lemma 3 is not the only way that one can imagine to construct a F-PE from a G-PE. In fact, as noted also by [22] in the context of using trapdoor permutations, there is a possibility of employing a more complicated "sharing-based" approach that generalizes the OR-based construction of Lemma 3.3. The idea is to use a set system S(·) in a similar way to the OR-based construction, but to encrypt the message M differently: Instead of encrypting the message M d a times, first construct some "shares" M 1 , . . . , M da of M , and then encrypt each M i using α i . To get the completeness and the security, we need the following two properties.
• Completeness: For every f ∈ F such that f (a) = 1, the set of indices
• Security: For every choice of a * , f * , f 1 , . . . , f k for k = poly(κ) such that f * (a * ) = 1 and
This is because otherwise the adversary can acquire keys for f 1 , . . . , f k and use the sub-keys planted in them to decrypt enough number of shares of M i 's and reconstruct M which is encrypted under the attribute a * .
As we will see, despite the fact that the sharing-based approach is more general than the ORbased approach, for the case of polynomial sized sets q = poly(κ), the construction of Lemma 3.3 is indeed as powerful as any sharing-based approach.
Lemma 3.4. There is a sharing based construction for the predicate system F using G if and only if there exists an OR-based construction.
Proof of Lemma 3.4. First suppose there is an OR-based construction for F using G using the set system S(·). By Definition 3.2 and the definition of the sharing based construction S(·) is already a sharing based construction as well, because C S (a * , f * ) = ∅, but C S (a * , f j ) = ∅ for all j ∈ [k] which implies the condition required for the sharing-based construction. Now suppose that S(·) is a sharing based construction with set sizes q = poly(κ) for F using G. Define the set system T (·) as follows: For every pair a ∈ A, f ∈ F such that f (a) = 0 and recall the set C S (a, f ) = {α | α ∈ S(a), ∃ϕ ∈ S(f ), ϕ(α) = 1}, and update a new value for S(a) according to S(a) ← S(a) \ C S (a, f ). After all these changes (which do not apply to any S(f )) take T (·) to be the new updated set system S(·). Now we claim that G can compute F using the set system T (·):
• First look at any pair a ∈ A, f ∈ F such that f (a) = 0. Then by the definition of T (·) we have already removed the set C S (a, f ) from T (·) and therefore it holds that
• Now consider any pair a ∈ A, f ∈ F such that f (a) = 1 and suppose for sake of contradiction that α∈T (a),ϕ∈T (f ) ϕ(α) = 0, which is equivalent to C T (a, f ) = ∅. Since S(·) was of set-size q, then we can always find a sequence f 1 , . . . , f k of length k ≤ q (or even potentially k = 0) such that they can "represent" the changes in S(a), namely
Note that also by definition of the way we changed S(·), for all i ∈ [k] holds that f i (a) = 0. Thus, the set {a, f, f 1 , . . . , f k } violates the security requirement of the sharing-based method.
A Combinatorial Argument Refuting OR-Based Constructions
Recall that by proving Theorem 4.1 we shall rule out the OR-based (and sharing-based) constructions of Section 3 along the way. A special case of the following combinatorial lemma shows that no OR-based (nor sharing-based) construction of τ -TPE from IBE exists for any constant 0 < τ < 1.
Moreover, not surprisingly, we will use this lemma in our proof of Theorem 4.1.
Lemma 3.5. Let F = A = {0, 1} κ denote the set of attributes and predicates for τ -TPE for a constant 0 < τ < 1. Also suppose that the following sets of size at most q = poly(κ) are assigned to F, A, and F × A : S(a) for a ∈ A, S(f ) for f ∈ F, and S(a, f ) for (a, f ) ∈ A × F. 1 Then, there exists a sampling algorithm Samp that, given an input parameter > 1/ poly(κ), outputs a 1 ) , . . . , (f k , a k ) such that with probability at least 1 − over the randomness of Samp the following holds:
1. f * (a * ) = 1 and f i (a i ) = 1 for all i ∈ [k] (this part holds with probability 1),
Moreover, the algorithm Samp chooses its k + 1 pairs without the knowledge of the set system S(·). Therefore we call Samp an oblivious sampler against predicate structure of τ -TPE.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. Let A be the set of vectors in {0, 1} κ of normalized Hamming weight τ , namely A = {a | a = (a 1 , . . . , a κ ) ∈ {0, 1} κ , i a i = τ · κ}. Also let F be the set of vectors in {0, 1} κ of normalized Hamming weight τ = τ + 1−τ 2 . Consider a bipartite graph G with nodes (A, F) and connect a ∈ A to f ∈ F iff f (a) = 1 according to τ -TPE (i.e., the indexes of the nonzero components of a is a subset of those of f ). We will later use the fact that G is a regular graph (on its F side). For any vertex x in G let N (x) be the set of neighbors of x in the graph G.
The covering-sampler acts as follows:
• Choose p = poly(κ) and h = poly(κ) to satisfy q(
g., this can be done by setting h = √ p and choosing p large enough).
• Choose f * $ ← F at random.
• Choose a * , a 1 , . . . , a p $ ← N (f * ) at random with possible repetition from the neighbors of f * .
• Output the p 2 + 1 pairs:
Now we prove that with probability at least 1 − /2 − neg(κ) > 1 − the output pairs have the properties specified in Lemma 3.5.
Property (1) holds by construction. Since 0 < τ < τ < 1 are constants, using standard probabilistic arguments one can easily show that the probability of f ij being connected to a * in G (i.e., f ij (a * ) = 1) is neg(κ) (given a * , a i are random subsets of f * , a random superset f ij of a i is exponentially unlikely to pick all the elements of a * ). Thus (2) holds.
The challenging part is to show that (3) holds, i.e., the following: With probability at least 1 − q(
. The proof will go through several claims.
In the following let h = √ p.
For an attribute node a ∈ A of G, define H(a) to be the set of "heavy" elements that with probability at least 1/h are present in S(a, f ) for a random neighbor f of a, i.e.,
Note that H(a) is not necessarily a subset of S(a).
Proof. Since G is regular on its F side, conditioned on a fixed a * the distribution of f * is still uniform over N (a * ). Now fix a * and fix an element b ∈ S(a * ). If b is not in H(a * ), then over the random choice of f * $ ← N (a * ), it holds that Pr[b ∈ S(a * , f * )] ≤ 1/h. The claim follows by a union bound over the q elements in S(a * ).
Claim 3.7. Define BE 2 to be the bad event "there exists a b ∈ S(f * ) such that b ∈ H(a * ) but for
Proof. It is enough to bound BE 2 by 1/p for a fixed b ∈ S(f * ) and the claim follows by union bound over the elements of S(f * ). But when b ∈ S(f * ) is fixed, we can pretend that a * is chosen at random from the sequence a 0 , . . . , a p after they are chosen and are fixed. In that case BE 2 happens if there is only a unique j ∈ {0, . . . , p} such that b ∈ H(a j ) and a * chooses to be a j . The latter happens with probability at most 1/(p + 1) < 1/p. Claim 3.8. Define BE 3 to be the bad event " given neither
Proof. We assume that the events BE 1 and BE 2 have not happened and do the analysis. By
holds by the definition of heavy sets, and thus b ∈ ∪ j S(a i , f ij ) can hold only with probability at most (1 − 1/h) p . By union bound, the probability that there exists a b ∈ S(a * )
From Claims 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8, it follows that (3) fails with probability at most q(
] will have the desired properties with probability at least 1 − neg(κ) − /2 which finishes the proof of Lemma 3.5.
Remark 3.9 (Generalizing Lemma 3.5). We observe that, by going over the proof of Lemma 3.5 more carefully, it can be realized that the only required properties for the pair of sets (F, A) to make the lemma hold are the following:
1. deg(f ) = deg(f ) for every f, f ∈ F, and 2. for a random f ∈ F and two of its random neighbors a, a ∈ N (f ), the probability that a and a have another common neighbor f ∈ F is a negligible function of κ. Roughly speaking this says that the occurrence of a K 2,2 in the bipartite graph G is unlikely or a random path of length 3 is unlikely to be completed into a C 4 .
Even though the proof of the black-box impossibility of the next section would refute any positive approach that includes as a special case the OR-based and sharing-based constructions, for sake of clarity, we first point out directly why Lemma 3.5 refutes those constructions.
Corollary 3.10. For any constant 0 < τ < 1, there is no OR-based (nor sharing-based) construction of τ -TPE schemes from IBE schemes. The claim holds also for any predicate encryption scheme (other than τ -TPE ) with the properties specified in Remark 3.9.
Proof. We directly refute sharing-based constructions and OR-based constructions are refuted as well since every OR-based construction can be thought of a sharing-based construction as well.
Suppose S(·) is a set system determining a sharing-based construction for τ -TPE in which the sets S(·) are defined for every predicate and attribute. We also define new sets S(a, f ) = S(f ) for every (a, f ) ∈ A × F. By definition of the OR-based construction from IBE, we note that S(a * ) ∩ S(f * ) = ∅ (where we identify the identities and the corresponding decryption keys). This way, it is easy to see that the sampling algorithm of Lemma 3.5 directly violates the security of the original sharing-based construction by giving a valid decryption key in the set ∪ i S(a i , f i ).
The Communication Complexity Approach
In this section we show an alternative approach to refute sharing-based constructions of predicate encryption schemes using separation results in two-party communication complexity. The strength of this new approach is its generality. In particular, using conjectured separations in communication complexity, we prove the impossibility of a sharing-based construction of NC 1 -PE from AC 0 -PE, thus making some progress toward the question of separating PE schemes based on the complexity classes the underlying predicates come from. On the other hand, we are currently able to apply this approach only to sharing-based constructions rather than to general black-box constructions. In contrast, Lemma 3.5 plays a critical role in our proof of full black-box separation of TPE from IBE. Lemma 3.5 indeed proves a stronger result than needed to refute sharing-based constructions from IBE as applied in Corollary 3.10. In particular, we are able to handle the sets S(a, f ) on the edges of the bipartite graph given by (A, F). These sets naturally arise in the attack strategy we employ in our proof.
Let (A, F) be a predicate encryption scheme. W.l.o.g. we identify A with {0, 1} κ and think of F as a family of functions {f b : {0, 1} κ → {0, 1}} b∈{0,1} κ , i.e., we assume for simplicity that |F| = 2 κ and its members are also indexed by b ∈ {0, 1} κ . We may sometimes abuse this notation a bit and refer to b itself as a member of F. We can then talk about the communications complexity of F when b ∈ F is given to Bob and a ∈ A to Alice. As usual, we can represent this communication complexity problem by the {0, 1}-matrix with rows indexed by A and columns by F. With a little more abuse of notation, we denote this matrix also by F = (f b (a)) a,b and refer to the communication complexity of F. Recall that the essential resource in communication complexity is the number of bits Alice and Bob need to communicate to determine f b (a). Various models such as deterministic, randomized (public or private coins), nondeterministic, etc., communication complexity can be defined naturally. For details on such models, we refer to the classic book by Kushilevitz and Nisan [24] , the paper by Babai et al. [2] , and the surveys by Lokam [28] and Lee and Shraibman [25] .
To connect communication complexity to OR-based constructions using IBE, we use the model of Merlin-Arthur games in communication complexity: Definition 3.11 (Merlin-Arthur Protocols in Communication Complexity). A matrix F is said to have an MA-protocol of complexity + c if there exists a c-bit randomized public-coin verification protocol Π between Alice and Bob such that
The MA-complexity of F, denoted MA(F), is the minimum complexity of an MA protocol for the matrix F.
With this definition, the well-known fact (see, for example, [24] ) that EQUALITY has public coin randomized communication complexity of O(1), and our Definition 3.2 of OR-construction, the following lemma is easy.
Lemma 3.12. Suppose there is an OR-based construction of a predicate encryption scheme (A, F) using an IBE scheme (B, G). Then MA(F) = O(log κ).
Proof. Merlin's proof (a nondeterministic move) w can simply be the label of an input wire to the OR gate, namely, ∨ i,j ϕ(α j ). Since (B, G) is an IBE scheme, ϕ i (α j ) = 1 iff ϕ i = α j , i.e., each of the inputs to the OR gate is an EQUALITY function. Alice and Bob can run an O(1)-bit randomized protocol to test this equality. This protocol is Arthur's verification protocol. Since i and j are bounded by poly(κ), it follows that the length of Merlin's proof is = O(log κ), because w is simply consisting of two indices i and j in the sets assigned to f and a. Thus MA(F) = O(log κ).
The following result due to Klauck [23] gives a matrix with high MA communication complexity: Theorem 3.13 (Klauck) 
Theorem 3.14. For some constant 0 < τ < 1, e.g., τ = 1/3, there is no OR-based (and hence no sharing-based) construction of a τ -TPE scheme from IBE.
Proof of Lemma 3.14. By Lemma 3.12, if (A, F) has an OR-based construction from an IBE, then the matrix F has MA-complexity at most polylog(κ). On the other hand, we will show that if (A, F) defines a τ -TPE scheme with τ = 1/3, then F must have MA-complexity Ω( √ κ To derive separations among stronger predicate encryption schemes based on sharing constructions, we need to recall definitions of languages and complexity classes in two-party communication complexity, in particular, PH cc and PSPACE cc . Complexity classes in two-party communication complexity are defined in terms of languages consisting of pairs of strings (a, b) such that |a| = |b|. Denote by {0, 1} 2 * the universe {(a, b) : a, b ∈ {0, 1} * and |a| = |b|}. For a language L ⊆ {0, 1} 2 * , we denote its characteristic function on pairs of strings of length κ by L κ . L κ is naturally represented as an 2 κ × 2 κ matrix with {0, 1} or ±1 entries.
Conversely, if A = {A K } is an infinite sequence of {0, 1}-matrices (where A K is K × K), then we can associate a language L A with A and talk about its communication complexity. L A is not necessarily unique (since the K's may be different from powers of two), but for the purposes of lower bounds we will fix one such language and refer to it as the language L A corresponding to A.
where • By allowing a bounded number of alternating quantifiers in Definition 3.15, we get an analog of the polynomial time hierarchy:
• We get an analog of PSPACE, by allowing an unbounded, but no more than polylog(κ), number of alternating quantifiers in Definition 3.15 :
The following lemma shows a connection between the communication complexity class PH cc and OR-based constructions using AC 0 -predicate encryption.
Lemma 3.17. Suppose a predicate encryption scheme (A, F) is obtained by an OR-based construction using an AC 0 -predicate encryption scheme. Then the language given by the sequence of matrices {F} κ is in PH cc .
Proof of Lemma 3.17. By hypothesis, for a given f b ∈ F, we have AC 0 circuits ϕ 1b , . . . , ϕ qb and for a given a ∈ A, we have α 1a , . . . , α qa such that f b (a) = ∨ i,j ϕ ib (α ja ). Knowing f b , Bob can compute the circuit
Knowing a, Alice can compute α a = (α 1a , . . . , α qa ) on which C b needs to be evaluated. We give a protocol with a bounded number of alternations for F. Let the depth of C b be d (including the top OR-gate). An existential player will have a move for an OR gate in C b and a universal player will have a move for an AND gate. Their d moves will describe an accepting path in C b on α a . For example, assuming AND and OR gates alternate in successive layers,
describes a path in C b -start with the top OR gate and follow the wire w 1 to the AND gate below and then the wire w 2 from this gate and so on -ending in a gate γ := γ(...) to witness the claim that f b (a) = 1. Since Bob knows C b , he can verify the correctness of the path w 1 w 2 · · · w k in the circuit and the type of the gate γ given by the path. He then sends the labels of the inputs and the type (AND or OR) of the gate to Alice, who responds with γ(α a ). Bob can verify that this will ensure C b (α a ) = 1. On the other hand, if C b (α a ) = 0, then it is easy to see that the existential player will not have a winning strategy to pass verification protocol of Alice and Bob on their inputs a and C b . It follows that F has a protocol with at most d alternations and hence {F} κ ∈ PH cc .
This lemma enables us to show the impossibility of OR-based (hence sharing-based) constructions of predicate encryption schemes using AC 0 -predicate encryption. Proof. Suppose PH cc = PSPACE cc . Let ψ : {0, 1} κ × {0, 1} κ → {0, 1} be the following "Sipser function" of depth log 2κ: it is a complete binary tree with alternating layers of AND and OR gates and each of the bottom gates receives as inputs an a i and a b i for 1 ≤ i ≤ κ . Computing ψ(a, b) when Alice holds a ∈ {0, 1} κ and Bob holds b ∈ {0, 1} κ is easily seen to be a PSPACE cc -complete problem. Hence it is not PH cc . It is also obvious that for any fixed b, ψ(·, b) is an NC 1 function. Defining A = {0, 1} κ and F = {ψ(·, b)} b , we see that (A, F) is an NC 1 -PE problem. Since the language given by F is not in PH cc , by Lemma 3.17, we conclude that (A, F) does not have an OR-based construction from any AC 0 -predicate encryption. Consider the Inner Product mod 2 function: ip2(a, 1) ip2(a,b) ) a,b is well-known to be an Hadamard matrix. Thus if Hadamard matrices are sufficiently rigid to apply Theorem ??, we can conclude that the communication problem given by ip2 is not in PH cc . Now, the proof of the second part is similar to the above.
Separating TPE from IBE
In this section we prove that there is no general black-box construction of threshold predicate encryption schemes from identity-based encryption schemes.
Theorem 4.1. Let κ ∈ N be the security parameter. Then, there exists an oracle O relative to which CCA secure IBE schemes exist, as per the Definition 2.5. However, for any constant 0 < τ < 1, there exists a query-efficient (i.e., that makes at most poly(κ) queries to O) adversary Adv that can break even the CPA security of any τ -TPE scheme relative to O, again as per the Definition 2.5. Moreover, Adv can be implemented in poly(κ)-time if given access to a PSPACE oracle, and its success probability can be made arbitrarily close to the completeness of the τ -TPE scheme.
In the next three subsections, we prove this theorem. Even though our overall proof strategy is somewhat similar to that of [11] , there are several conceptual and technical differences as explained in the introduction. In Section 4.1, we define our random IBE oracle, prove some of its properties, and define some operations that allow us to assume a nice structure for such an oracle. In Section 4.2 we describe our attack on a τ -TPE relative to this IBE oracle. Finally, we analyze this attack for query efficiency and success probability in Section 4.3. Lemma 4.13 gives a lower bound on the success probability of the attack. Its proof involves three experiments and estimating the statistical distance between successive pairs in them. The analysis also uses the combinatorial lemma 3.5.
The Oracle
We begin the proof of Theorem 4.1 by first defining our random IBE oracle, O IBE , also denoted by O for short, (which trivially implies a CCA secure IBE as outlined in Remark 4.3), and then breaking any τ -TPE (with a constant τ ) relative to this oracle. O = (g, k, id, e, d) ). By O λ we refer to the part of O whose answers are λ bits, and O is the union of O λ for all λ.
Construction 4.2 (The randomized oracle
• The master-key generating oracle g : {0, 1} λ → {0, 1} λ is a random permutation that takes as input a secret-key sk ∈ {0, 1} λ , and returns a public-key pk ∈ {0, 1} λ .
• The decryption-key generating oracle k : {0, 1} 2λ → {0, 1} λ takes as input a secret-key sk ∈ {0, 1} λ and an identity α ∈ {0, 1} λ , and returns a decryption-key dk α ∈ {0, 1} λ . We require k(sk, ·) to be a random permutation over {0, 1} λ for every sk ∈ {0, 1} λ .
• The identity finding oracle id : {0, 1} 2λ → {0, 1} λ takes as input a public-key pk ∈ {0, 1} λ and a decryption-key dk ∈ {0, 1} λ , and returns the unique α such that k(sk, α) = dk, where sk = g −1 (pk).
• The encryption oracle e : {0, 1} 3λ → {0, 1} λ takes as input a public-key pk ∈ {0, 1} λ , an identity α ∈ {0, 1} λ and a message m ∈ {0, 1} λ , and returns a ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1} λ . We require e(pk, α, ·) to be a random permutation over {0, 1} λ for every (pk, α) ∈ {0, 1} 2λ .
• The decryption oracle d : {0, 1} 3λ → {0, 1} λ takes as input a public-key pk ∈ {0, 1} λ , a decryption-key dk ∈ {0, 1} λ and a ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1} λ , and returns the unique m such that e(pk, α, m) = c, where α = id(pk, dk).
By an IBE oracle, we refer to an oracle in the support set of O, Supp(O), and by a partial IBE oracle we refer to a partial oracle that could be extended to an oracle in Supp(O).
Remark 4.3 (CCA secure IBE relative to O).
To encrypt a bit b ∈ {0, 1} under the identity α and the public-key pk, the encryption algorithm will randomly extend b to a λ-bit random string:
, 1} λ−1 and gets the encryption c = e(pk, α, m). To decrypt, one first decrypts c and then take the first bit as the encrypted bit. By independently encrypting the bits of an input message m = (m 1 , . . . , m n ) of length n = poly(κ), and by using a standard hybrid argument, one can generalize the scheme to arbitrary long messages. The construction that we briefly described above is only CPA secure, where any adversary has advantage at most 2 −Θ(κ) . But, this can easily and in a black-box manner be transformed into a CCA secure construction, without incurring any additional assumptions, using the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform [15, 16] in the random oracle model [6] . We note that even though O is not exactly a random oracle, for our purposes it suffices to use one of the sub-oracles of O as a random oracle in the above transform.
The sub-oracle id is not required to get a secure IBE scheme, it will be used by our query-efficient adversary who breaks any τ -TPE scheme (for constant τ ) relative to O. We also note that adding this sub-oracle to O does not prevent O from realizing a secure IBE scheme. It is easy to see that in the IBE security game (as a special case of the security game of predicate encryption), for every decryption-key that he gets from the challenger, the adversary already knows the corresponding identities.
As we will see later, any τ -TPE scheme (for constant τ ) relative to O can be broken by a poly(κ)-query adversary which suffices to get a black-box separation of τ -TPE from IBE. Since our adversary can be easily implemented efficiently given access to a PSPACE-complete oracle, it also shows that no relativizing reduction from τ -TPE to IBE) exists either [20] 2 .
To describe and analyze our attack, we first need to formally define and study some properties of our random IBE oracle O. • For any (sk, pk, α, dk) ∈ {0, 1} 4λ , if g(sk) = pk and k(sk, α) = dk, then we call g(sk) = pk the root query; k(sk, α) = dk and id(pk, dk) = α the dual (to each other) queries; and all three of them the triangle.
• For any (pk, α, dk, m, c) ∈ {0, 1} 5λ , if id(pk, dk) = α and e(pk, α, m) = c, then we call id(pk, dk) = α the root query; e(pk, α, m) = c and d(pk, dk, c) = m the dual (to each other) queries; and all three of them the triangle.
Definition 4.5 (Closure of Partial IBE Oracles). Let P = (g, k, id, e, d) be a partial IBE oracle. By the closure of P, denoted as P = (g, k, id, e, d) we refer to another partial oracle which contains P as a subset and in addition it might have answers defined for more queries as follows.
(a) If [k(sk, α) = dk] ∈ P then add the dual query id(pk, dk) = α to P.
(b) If [id(pk, dk) = α] ∈ P then add the dual query k(sk, α) = dk to P.
(a) If [e(pk, α, m) = c] ∈ P, then add the dual query d(pk, dk, c) = m to P.
, then add the dual query e(pk, α, m) = c to P.
In all the cases above, the dual query which is added to P is called the dependent query (with respect to P). For any query x, if x ∈ P we call x a free query (again, with respect to P).
Definition 4.6 (Normal Form). We say an oracle algorithm A O is in normal form, if:
• When A is about to ask an oracle query x of the form k(sk, α) = dk, then before asking x, it makes the query g(sk) = pk, and after asking x it also makes the query id(pk, dk) = α.
• When A is about to ask an oracle query x of the form d(pk, dk, c) = m, then before asking x, it makes the query id(pk, dk) = α, and after asking x it also makes the query e(pk, α, m) = c.
By the normalized version of an algorithm A, we denoted the modified (but with the same functionality as before) version of it that asks some required additional queries as above, so that the resulting algorithm is in normal form. We also call a partial oracle P = (g, k, id, e, d) normalized if it has the following two properties:
• If [k(sk, α) = dk] ∈ P, then g(sk) = pk and id(pk, dk) = α are also defined in P for some pk.
• If [d(pk, dk, c) = m] ∈ P, then id(pk, dk) = α and e(pk, α, m) = c are also defined in P for some α.
The view of any normalized algorithm A clearly contains a normalized partial oracle.
Note that by normalizing any algorithm, the number of queries that it asks increases by at most a factor of 3.
Closure of Normalized Partial Oracles. When we take the closure of a normalized partial oracle P, a slightly simpler definition can be used. In particular, in the second bullet of Definition 4.5, we can condition at the case [id(pk, dk) = α] ∈ P (rather than using the condition [id(pk, dk) = α] ∈ P). This is because due to normal form property, the query/answer id(pk, dk) = α already exists in P. This modification of the definition of closure will simplify some of our arguments in the next subsections. Note that for a normalized partial oracle P, taking the closure can at most double the number of queries: |P| ≤ 2 · |P|. 3 The next two lemmas hold in a more general setting where normal form is not required, but the proof is easier in the case of normal form (and we only need this special case), so we only specify and prove them in the special case of normal form.
Lemma 4.7 (Lazy Evaluation). Suppose P is a partial IBE oracle over queries of output length λ (i.e., there exists Q ∈ Supp(O λ ) such that P ⊆ Q), and let |P| = t (i.e., there are t queries defined in P) and t < 2 λ−1 . Then, for any query x to O which is not inside the closure of P (i.e., x ∈ P), the statistical distance between the answer of O conditioned on P being part of O (i.e., (O(x) | P ⊆ O)) and the uniform distribution over {0, 1} λ is at most O(t/2 λ ). (Note that the answers to the queries in P are already fixed.)
Proof of Lemma 4.7. We can assume w.l.o.g. that P = P (because otherwise we can let Q = P and work with Q instead of P). We call such partial oracles P = P self-closured. We also simply assume that t is still the size of P (even though its value might change by a factor of 2 after moving to the closure of P).
The proof has the following general steps: (1) For a self-closured P we present a randomized procedure that samples a full oracle from the distribution (O λ | P ⊆ O λ ). (2) Then we will show that during the above randomized sampling process, the answer to any query x such that x / ∈ P, is chosen O(t/2 λ )-close to uniform over {0, 1} λ .
For starters suppose the IBE oracles does not have any encryption e or decryption d part and only consists of (g, k, id). A crucial point is that for any (sk 1 , pk 1 ) = (sk 2 , pk 2 ) ∈ {0, 1} 2λ , if [g(sk 1 ) = pk 1 ] ∈ O and [g(sk 2 ) = pk 2 ] ∈ O, then the queries to k and id sub-oracles that are related to (sk 1 , pk 1 ) (i.e., their first input is either of sk 1 or pk 1 ) are answered independently of the queries that are related to (sk 2 , pk 2 ). Based on (variants of) this simple observation (and relying on the fact that P is a normal self-closured partial oracle of size t), in the simplified case of IBE oracles (without e and d sub-oracles), we can extend the partial oracle P to a full oracle as follows:
1. For every query [g(sk) = pk] ∈ P, we finish sampling the queries (and their responses) to k and id sub-oracles that are related to (either of) (sk, pk). Note that since P is self-closured, for every query to k or id that involves (either of) (sk, pk), its dual is also already defined in P. So, all we have to do is to randomly match the remaining queries that involve (sk, pk) in dual pairs. The answers that are sampled in this step are chosen uniformly at random from a space of size at least 2 λ − t, and so the answers are O(t/2 λ )-close to uniform. After this step all the k and id queries that could be related to (sk, pk) are defined.
At this point we say that we have covered all the g(sk) = pk queries inside P. We also say that a k or id query inside P is covered in this step, if they are related to some (sk, pk) such that g(sk) = pk is covered. Note that all the k queries of P will be covered in the step for sure, because due to the normal form property of P all of the k(sk, ·) queries make the relevant g(sk) = pk query to be asked (and exist in P) as well.
2. In this step we go over the remaining uncovered queries of P which could only be some id queries. For any such query [id(pk, dk) = α] ∈ P, we would like to sample some sk ∈ {0, 1} λ and set g(sk) = pk, but we want to do it from its correct distribution conditioned on the sampled parts of O and P. It is easy to see that the distribution of sk in this case is completely uniform among all the sk's such that the query g(sk) is not already covered.
3. After sampling some sk and pairing them with some pk's for all the queries of the form [id(pk, dk) = α] ∈ P in the previous step, now we can go over these newly generated mappings g(sk) = pk, and cover their related k and id queries as in Step 1.
4. Then, we go over all the unused pk's and sk's and randomly pair them together to complete the description of the sub-oracle g. In this step also, the answers are chosen from a space that is of size at least 2 λ − t.
For any mapping g(sk)
= pk generated in the previous step, we choose a random permutation over {0, 1} λ and use that permutation to define the relevant k and id queries.
If we go over the above steps, it can be seen that the only step that the sampled answers might not be chosen from a space of size at least 2 λ − t is in Step 2. In particular, suppose sk is selected in this step and is assigned to some already fixed pk through the query g(sk) = pk. The key point is that for any such fixed query g(sk) out of P the probability that it is chosen to be mapped to some fixed pk is at most t/2 λ , simply because the number of such pk's is at most t. On the other hand, if sk is not selected in Step 2, its answer will be chosen in other steps which will be from a space of size at least 2 λ − t. Therefore, the statistical distance between the sampled answer to g(sk) and the uniform over {0, 1} λ will be at most t/2 λ + O(t/2 λ ) which is still O(t/2 λ ).
For the general case of IBE oracles, we follow a similar sampling procedure and then will study the statistical distance between the sampled answers and the uniform distribution over {0, 1} λ . The sampling has more steps, and we choose to write it more concisely (some of the steps corresponding to the simplified case above will be merged into one step), but the main ideas are very similar to the simpler case of IBE oracles studied above.
1. For every query [id(pk, dk) = α] ∈ P, consider all the e and d queries that potentially can be related to (pk, dk, α) (i.e., they are of the form e(pk, α, ·) or d(pk, dk, ·)). Since P is selfclosured, the subset of these queries that are inside P can be partitioned into dual pairs. So, we go over all the new e, d queries (out of P) that relate to (pk, dk, α) and randomly partition them into dual pairs of queries. (Similar to the simplified case above, due to normal form property of P, after this step there will be no d query in P that is not covered.
2.
We go over all the queries of the form [e(pk, α, m) = c] ∈ P that are not covered in the previous step. If no sk is mapped to this pk we sample a random sk (from the ones that are not used yet) and add g(sk) = pk to the set of sampled queries. Then we finish sampling the k and id queries that are related to the pair (sk, pk). A crucial point is that at the end of this step, we sample at most t new dk's and assign them to some (sk, pk) pair such that [e(pk, α, m) = c] ∈ P. Moreover, these (at most) t sampled dk's are chosen uniformly from a set of size at least 2 λ −t. Therefore, for any particular fixed dk, the probability that we choose it and sample the query id(pk, dk) = α (while [e(pk, α, m) = c] ∈ P ) is at most t/(2 λ − t) which is still O(t/2 λ ) for t < 2 λ /2.
3. For every query [e(pk, α, m) = c] ∈ P handled in the previous step, let dk be the sampled decryption key such that id(pk, dk) = α is sampled there. Now, we go back to finish covering all the queries that could be related to (pk, dk, α) (similar to Step 1) . An important point is that in this step, the d queries that are covered and are of the form d(pk, dk, c) might not be answered from a close-to-uniform distribution, and their answers might be already fixed to to some existing uncovered e(pk, α, m) = c query of P. However, for any fixed such query d(pk, dk, c), as we discussed at the end of the previous step, the probability that this dk is sampled in some query id(pk, dk) = α, is at most O(t/2 λ ), and thus its answer is still chosen O(t/2 λ )-close to uniform.
The remaining three steps are similar to the sampling procedure of the simplified IBE oracles.
For every query [g(sk)
= pk] ∈ P that is not covered in the previous step, go over all of its k and id related queries and sample all of them that have not been sampled yet. At the end of this step, there is no k query inside P which is not covered yet.
5. For every uncovered query [id(pk, dk) = α] ∈ P, sample an unused sk, and add the g(sk) = pk to the set of sampled queries. Then, go over all the k and id queries that are related to g(sk) = pk and randomly partition the remaining queries into dual pairs. Then, for all of the queries of the form id(pk, dk) = α covered in this step (which are in or out of P) generate a random permutation and use this permutation to define the e, d queries related to id(pk, dk) = α.
6. Randomly pair all the remaining sk and pk's to finish sampling of g. Then, for each new sampled query g(sk) = pk, generate a random permutation over {0, 1} λ and use it to define the k and id queries that are related to (sk, pk). Finally, for each sampled query id(pk, dk) = α of this step, generate a random permutation over {0, 1} λ and use it to define the e and d queries that are related to (pk, dk, α). This finishes the sampling of the full oracle O by extending P.
In the sampling procedure above, the only steps in which some of the sampled answers might not be chosen from a space of size at least 2 λ − t are Steps 3 and 5. We already explained why
Step 3 does not violate our claim of Lemma 4.7, and Step 5 is identical to the case that we studied in the simplified case earlier.
Below is an important remark that will be crucial in many of the proofs.
Remark 4.8. Suppose A is a normalized algorithm asking t oracle queries to O λ . Now, instead of feeding O λ to A, suppose we do the following: whenever a new query is in the closure of the A's currnet view's set of queries, we use the determined answer, otherwise we use a uniformly random answer from {0, 1} λ . Lemma 4.7 shows that this "lazy evaluation" of the oracle O λ is
Lemma 4.9 (Malformed Triangles). Suppose A is a normalized algorithm asking t oracle queries to our random IBE oracle O λ . Also, let there be three queries x 1 , x 2 , x 3 in the view of A which form a triangle with x 1 as its root. We say that the view of A has a malformed triangle (call it the event B), if the first appearance of x 1 , the root of the triangle, in the view of A is not the first among {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 }, the triangle. It holds that Pr[B] ≤ O(t 2 /2 λ ).
Proof of Lemma 4.9. By Lemma 4.7 and Remark 4.8, if we use a lazy evaluation of the oracle O λ , then the distribution of the view of the algorithm A changes by at most a statistical distance of O(t 2 /2 λ ). But when we use the lazy evaluation, at any time that a free query is asked, the probability that it becomes the root of a malformed triangle is at most O(t/2 λ ). In particular, when g(sk) is asked for the first time and is going to be the root of a malformed triangle that includes a previously asked query id(pk, dk) = α, we would get pk as the answer to g(sk) only with probability at most 1/2 λ . (Note that the previously asked node of the triangle could not be the query k(sk, α) = dk, because A is normalized, and therefore the query k(sk, α) would make g(sk) to be asked even before itself!).
Similarly, suppose the query id(pk, dk) is being asked for the first time and is going to be the root of a malformed triangle. Similar to the argument above, the previously asked node of this triangle can not be a query of the form d(pk, dk, c), because then id(pk, dk) would have already been asked from the oracle. So, suppose the previously asked node of the triangle is a query of the form e(pk, α, m) = c. In this case, if id(pk, dk) is a free query in the view of A at the time of being asked, then it will be responded α with probability at most 2 −λ , and if it is due to an (inherently free) query of the form k(sk, α) (which, due to the assumed normal form property is asked right before id(pk, dk)), the answer to this query would be dk with probability at most 2 −λ .
By a union bound, the probability of getting a malformed triangle in the lazy evaluation of A is at most t 2 /2 λ . By incorporating the statistical distance of moving to the lazy evaluation, the probability of getting a malformed triangle remains at most
Our Attack
In this section we present an attack that aims to break any τ -TPE in an O-relativized world by asking only poly(κ) queries to the random IBE oracle O, where κ is the security parameter of the τ -TPE scheme. We prove the query-efficiency and the success probability of our attack in the next section. Similar to the attack of [11] , our attack can easily be implemented in poly(κ)-time if P = PSPACE, and the relativizing reductions can be ruled out by adding a PSPACE oracle to O.
We first note that any black-box construction of τ -TPE scemes from IBE schemes can potentially call the oracle O λ over different values of λ which are potentially different from the security parameter of the τ -TPE scheme itself. However, similar to [11] , we assume that the τ -TPE scheme asks its queries to O λ only for one value of λ. This assumption is purely to simplify our presentation of the attack and its analysis, and all the arguments below extend to the general case (of asking queries over any parameter λ > log s) in a straightforward way.
We also assume that λ is large enough in the sense that 2 λ > s for an arbitrarily large s = poly(κ) that can be chosen in the description of the attack. The reason for the latter assumption is that the adversary can always ask and learn all the oracle queries to O that are of logarithmic length O(λ) = O(log κ), simply because there are at most 2 O(λ) = poly(κ) many queries of this form. 4 Now we describe our attack algorithm that participates in the security game of τ -TPE schemes in a relativized world with access to the oracle O of Construction 4.2. In the next section, we will show that this adversary succeeds in breaking the security with a high probability.
Construction 4.10 (Adv Attacking the Scheme τ -TPE
O ). The parameters are as follows. q: the total number of queries asked by the components of the scheme τ -TPE all together, κ: the security parameter of τ -TPE, = 1/ poly(κ) and s = poly(κ): input parameter to the adversary Adv, λ ≤ poly(κ): the parameter which determines the output length of the queries asked by the components of τ -TPE to the oracle O. It is assumed that 2 λ > s for some s = poly(κ) to be chosen later.
Our adversary Adv executes the following.
1. Sampling Predicates and Attributes: Adv executes the sampling algorithm Samp of Lemma 3.5 with the parameter , over the predicate structure of τ -TPE, to get k + 1 pairs (a * , f * ), {(a i , f i )} i∈ [k] . Recall that this sampling is done only by knowing the predicate structure of τ -TPE and is independent of the actual implementation of the scheme. It can be done, for example, without the knowledge of PK.
2. Receiving the Keys: Adv receives from the challenger: the public-key PK and the decryptionkeys {DK i } i∈ [k] , where DK i is the generated decryption-key for f i . We also assume that DK * is generated by the challenger, although Adv does not receive it. Let V be the view of the algorithms executed by the challenger so far that generated the keys PK, DK * , DK 1 , . . . , DK k . Let Q(V ) be the partial oracle consisting of the queries (and their answers) specified in V . By writing in the bold font V, we refer to V as a random variable. 
) be the distribution of the random variable V (also including the randomness of O) conditioned on the knowledge of (L j , PK, {DK} i∈ [k] ). Now, if there is any query x such that x ∈ L j but Pr[x ∈ Q(V j )] ≥ , Adv asks the lexicographically first such
, and goes to round j + 1. In other words, as long as there is any new query x that is -heavy to be in the closure of the queries of the view of the key-generations, Adv asks such a query x. If no such query exists, Adv breaks the loop and goes to the next step.
(Note that the above and the following steps may require a PSPACE-complete oracle to be implemented efficiently.)
5. Guessing Challenger's View: Let L be the partial oracle consisting of the oracle queries (and their answers) that Adv learned in Steps 3 and 4 (i.e., L = L , where Q(V ) had no -heavy queries to be learned). Let
, and sample V $ ← V chal . Let SK and DK * be in order, the "guessed" values for the secret-key and the decryption-key of f * determined by the sampled V . We note that by definition the other keys PK , {DK i } i∈ [k] determined by V are the same as the ones that Adv has received: PK, {DK i } i∈ [k] . The Oracle O : At the beginning of the decryption of Step 6 the partially defined oracle O is equal to L ∪ Q(V ), namely the learned queries (and their answers) together with the guessed ones specified in V . Afterwards, if a new query x is asked:
• if x ∈ O , return O (x), otherwise
• if x ∈ O , then return y = O (x) and add (x, y) to O , and finally
• if x ∈ O , ask x from O and add (x, O(x)) to O .
Analysis of Our Attack
In this section we will show that our adversary asks only poly(κ) queries (on average), and it is able to correctly decrypt the challenge ciphertext with probability close to the completeness of the scheme τ -TPE. Proof of Lemma 4.11. Recall that in a full execution of the algorithms (G, K, E, D) of τ -TPE the total number of queries asked is at most q. Therefore, the number of oracle queries asked by Adv in Steps 3 and 6 is at most kq + q. The only step in which the number of oracle queries is unclear is Step 4. Barak and Mahmoody [3] proved the following general lemma that can be used to argue about the expected number of queries asked in Step 4.
Lemma 4.12 ( [3]
). Let A be some randomized algorithm that asks at most q oracle queries to some (potentially randomized) oracle O and then outputs some message K. Let B be the algorithm that receives K and keeps asking oracle queries to O as follows. Let L be the partial oracle consisting of B's knowledge about the oracle O at any moment. As long as there is any query x ∈ L such that Pr[x asked by A | K, L] ≥ , then B asks the first x satisfying this condition and adds (x, O(x)) to L. Then, it holds that the expected number of queries asked by B is at most q/ .
Barak and Mahmoody only (needed and) proved Lemma 4.12 for the case that O is a random oracle, but the very same proof holds for any oracle. In our case, the adversary Adv receives the partial information PK, {DK i } i∈ [k] from the challenger which is similar to the way B gets K from A. However, in Step 4, Adv keeps learning -heavy queries that are in the closure of the queries of the view of the challenger. To handle this issue, we can think of the algorithm A as the challenger's algorithm who is generating the keys, but A in addition also asks the dependent queries of the challenger's view from the oracle O so that A's view will be self-closured. This way, the total number of queries asked by A might increase by a constant factor, but it will still be at most O(kq). Now we can use Lemma 4.12 to conclude that the expected number of total number of queries asked by Adv is at most kq + O(kq/ ) + q = O(kq/ ).
By stopping the adversary if his number of queries in Step 4 exceeds kq/ 2 , we can assume that Adv asks at most O(kq/ 2 ) = poly(κ) number of queries (in the worst case), and this will affect Adv's success probability only by O( ). Now we study the success probability of (this modified) Adv.
Lemma 4.13 (Success of Adv). Let ρ be the completeness of the scheme τ -TPE that Adv is attacking, and let t = kq/ 2 + q(k + 1) be the upper-bound on the number of queries that are asked by either Adv or the challenger. Then, Adv will correctly decrypt the challenge ciphertext (i.e., b = b) with probability at least ρ − O(q + t 2 /s).
By taking s = poly(κ) large enough one can make the success probability of Adv close to ρ. In the rest of this section we prove Lemma 4.13.
Three Experiments and Their Outputs
For the proof of Lemma 4.13 we define three experiments: Attack, Hybrid, and Ideal. The first one, Attack is the experiment in which the attack is performed, the third one, Ideal is an ideal experiment with no adversary involved, and the second one, Hybrid is a hybrid experiment that relates the probability of success in the other two experiments.
The outputs of the three experiments denoted Out att , Out hyb , and Out idl are defined with respect to the general structure of Construction 4.10 and consist of the following from the Experiment Attack, Hybrid, and Ideal, respectively: the partial oracle L (i.e., part of O that is learned in Steps 3 and 4), the sampled view V of Step 5, and finally the view of the encryption and the decryption performed in Step 6. Now, we proceed with the detailed description of these experiments.
• Experiment Attack with output Out att . This experiment is simply the attack played by our adversary Adv, as defined in Construction 4.10.
• Experiment Hybrid with output Out hyb . Hybrid differs from Attack as follows:
1. The oracle O is used also in the encryption of the challenge bit b (in Step 6) . Note that, this way, the answers of O during the decryption of the challenge might also depend on the previous answers returned by O during the encryption of the challenge.
2. The oracle O never forwards its queries to O and instead tosses coins to answer such queries. More formally, if a new query x is asked such that x / ∈ O , the oracle O returns a random string y $ ← {0, 1} λ , and adds [x → y] to O . Note that O does not try to respect the permutation structure of the oracle O, but as we will see, due to the assumed condition 2 λ > s, the permutation structures will be preserved with a high probability anyway. In other words, after learning L and sampling V , the oracle queries in Hybrid are answered using the lazy evaluation method as defined in Lemma 4.7 and Remark 4.8.
• Experiment Ideal with output Out idl . This experiment differs from the previous experiments in two ways:
1. In the step of guessing the challenger's view (Step 5), the sampled V is chosen to be equal to the real view of the challenger V .
The oracle O is simply the same as O.
Another way to describe Ideal is to say that there is no adversary, and the challenger is generating the output Out idl by performing all the steps and simply taking V = V .
At a high level, when compared to the experiments used in the proof of the main result of [11] , our Attack corresponds to their Exp 0 , our Hybrid corresponds to a combination of Exp 1 and Epx 2 (which, in light of our simplifications, we found it easier to study their combination directly), and finally, Ideal corresponds to their Exp 3 .
Lemma 4.13 follows from the following three lemmas in a straightforward way.
Lemma 4.14 (Success in Ideal).
Lemma 4.14 is directly implied by the ρ-completeness of the underlying τ -TPE scheme.
Proof of Lemma 4.15. First we note that the joint distribution of the components of Out idl and Out hyb which are sampled during Step 2 through Step 4 are identically distributed. Moreover, although V is not the real view of the challenger, since it is sampled from the distribution of V conditioned on the previously sampled parts of the output, therefore the experiments Ideal and Hybrid will produce their (partial) outputs during Step 2 through
Step 5 from the same distributions.
What remains is to compare the way the two experiments proceed in their final step of encrypting and decrypting the challenge. The only difference here is that in Hybrid (as opposed to Ideal) we are employing the lazy evaluation method to answer the oracle queries. Therefore Lemma 4.15 follows from Remark 4.8 and the assumed fact that 2 λ > s.
It only remains to prove Lemma 4.16. Without loss of generality, we make the following assumptions about the scheme τ -TPE and our adversary Adv.
Putting τ -TPE and Adv in Normal Form. In the following, we will assume w.l.o.g. that the τ -TPE scheme is normalized. Note that putting a scheme into normal form does not change its functionality, so the adversary can pretend that the scheme he is attacking is already in normal form. This way, the number of oracle queries in the protocol, in the mind of the attacker, will still be at most O(q), and this will affect the bounds of Lemma 4.11 and Lemma 4.13 only by a constant factor, which because we present those bounds asymptotically, the statements will still hold without any changes whatsoever. The main point is that when the adversary considers the scheme to be in normal form, certain oracle queries that previously were not heavy conditioned on its own view, might become heavy now, and that makes the adversary's learning of the information about the oracle O relatively more effective.
We will also assume that the adversary follows the normal form restrictions in his own learning phase as well (i.e., Step 4). Namely, if he asks k(sk, α) = dk or d(pk, dk, c) = m, then he also makes the relevant additional queries to follow the rules of normal form. Note that this change in adversary's algorithm could only improve the quality of the attack while increasing the querycomplexity of the attack by at most a constant factor.
Before going over the experiments Attack and Hybrid in parallel and bounding the statistical distance between them, we note that Attack and Hybrid are different only in their last step of encrypting and decrypting the challenge (i.e., Step 6). Thus, we can assume that when we get to the final step, all the previous corresponding components of the two experiments are the same, and then we study how both the experiments continue in generating their outputs. In fact, even during the execution of Step 6, we continue to assume that the two experiments have proceeded in the same way so far, and then bound the statistical distance between the answers of the next query in both the experiments conditioned on some "bad" events not happening. And, we also bound the probability of these bad events to be small.
We will refer to the bad events as (·) att , (·) hyb , along the comparison of the experiments Attack and Hybrid (the index of the event indicating the experiment in which it is defined). We will take the bigger bad events B att and B hyb to be the union of all the bad sub-events defined in Attack and Hybrid, respectively, and will bound their probabilities by bounding the probabilities of all the sub-events in each of the experiments. Then, Lemma 4.13 will follow from Lemma 2.2.
Defining and Bounding the Bad Events
Recall that in both experiments Attack and Hybrid, V is the real view of the key-generations, and V is the guessed value of V sampled by Adv in Step 5.
Definition 4.17 (Secret Queries). In the experiments Attack and Hybrid, for U ∈ {V, V }, we define the secret queries of U as Q(U ) \ L. Namely, these are the queries in the closure of U which the adversary didn't learn during Step 3 or the learning phase of Step 4. Proof. As a mental experiment, we can first finish the execution of the final encryption (which uses the oracle O) and then go back and sample the view V from its distribution V chal . This way, the probability of HIT att remains the same. But, since there is no -heavy query in the distribution of Q(V chal ) \ L, and since there are a total of at mostueries in the view of the final encryption, by a union bound the probability that any of them is in Q(V chal ) \ L is at most q .
The following lemma bounds an event similar to that in Lemma 4.18, but in the experiment Hybrid. Also, here we additionally include the queries of the final decryption.
Lemma 4.19. Let HIT hyb be the event that in the experiment Hybrid, during the final encryption and decryption of Step 6, a secret query
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 4.18, but since this time we are working in the experiment Hybrid, we can go ahead and finish even the final decryption, and only then come back and sample V from its distribution V chal . We could not necessarily do it similarly in Attack, because during the decryption of Attack we might forward queries to O due to the way O is defined in Attack. By a similar union bound, the probability that any query x ∈ L that is asked during the final encryption or decryption of Step 6, and is sampled in Q(V chal ) is at most O(q ).
Definition 4.20 (Event MAL). Suppose we give the following artificial order to the queries specified in the output of our experiments:
• S(a): The set of pairs of (pk, α) such that some query of the form e(pk, α, m) = c is asked during the encryption of the random bit under a.
• S(f ): The set of pairs of (pk, α) such that some query of the form id(pk, dk) = α is asked either during the generation of the master public-key or the generation of the decryption-key for f .
• S(a, f ): The set of pairs of (pk, α) such that some query of the form id(pk, dk) = α is asked during the decryption of the random bit encrypted under a using the decryption-key generated for f .
By the properties of the sampling algorithm Samp of Lemma 3.5 with probability 1 − over the choice of (a * , f * ), (a 1 , f 1 ), . . . , (a k , f k ) it holds that
S(a i , f i ).
But, it is easy to see that in order for INT 2 idl to hold there should be some (pk, α) that belongs to all of S(a * ), S(f * ), S(a * , f * ), and the query id(pk, dk) = α is not learned during any of the decryptions of Step 3 (because otherwise id(pk, dk) = α would have been in L). But the above relation over the sets sampled by Samp implies the opposite. Therefore INT • S(a): The set of pk such that some query of the form id(pk, dk) = α is asked during the encryption of the random bit under a.
• S(f ): The set of pk such that some query of the form g(sk) = pk is asked either during the generation of the public-key or the generation of the decryption-key for f .
• S(a, f ): The set of pk such that some query of the form g(sk) = pk is asked during the decryption under f of the random bit encrypted under a.
The rest of the proof remains the same.
Comparing Experiments Attack and Hybrid
Finally, in this section we will compare the behavior of Attack and Hybrid in their final step. We will first go over the execution of the encryption of the challenge bit (and how its oracle queries are answered), and then will cover the decryption of it using oracle O (which is defined differently in Attack and Hybrid). All we have to show is that in every oracle query, the experiments proceed O(t/s)-close unless one of the bad events defined in Appendix 4. O(t/s) = O(t 2 /s) + O(q · ) which finishes the proof of Lemma 4.16. (The summation is done for t instead ofueries, which is the bound on the number of queries asked by τ -TPE algorithms, because to be able to use lazy evaluation it is important to know the number of queries asked so far, and t is the upper bound on the number of queries made by our adversary.)
1. Encrypting the Challenge Bit. Suppose a query x is asked during the encryption of
Step 6, and Attack and Hybrid have proceeded identically so far. Here, by O we refer to the partial oracle (in both experiments) which includes only the answers to the queries that are asked so far from the oracle O (this also includes Q(V ) where V is the real view of the key-generations which is not known to Adv). Since O (resp., O ) is used in the final encryption of Attack (resp., Hybrid), the answer to the query x in Attack (resp., Hybrid) depends on whether x is a free query with respect to O (resp., O ), or not. Below we discuss the different possible cases.
(a) If x is a free query for both of O and O : In this case, by Lemma 4.7 the answer to x in both experiments is O(t/s)-close to uniform over {0, 1} λ , and so they are O(t/s)-close. (b) If x is a free query for O (i.e., x ∈ O , so x ∈ L), but it is not a free query for O (i.e.,
x ∈ O): Suppose x 1 and x 2 are the two queries in O that make x dependent, where x 2 is the dual query of x and x 1 is the root of the triangle.
i. If both of x 1 , x 2 are in Q(V ) \ L, then x ∈ Q(V ) \ L will be a secret query of V . Therefore, by asking x the bad event HIT hyb happens. ii. If none of x 1 , x 2 is in Q(V ) \ L, then they are both in O , which implies that x ∈ O (but we assumed the other way). iii. If x 1 ∈ Q(V ) \ L and x 2 ∈ O , then since x 1 is the root, due to the normal form condition of τ -TPE, right before asking either of x or x 2 , the query x 1 is also asked to O . This implies the event HIT hyb happened. iv. If x 2 ∈ Q(V ) \ L and x 1 ∈ O then A. If x 2 is a query asked to k (resp., d), then the root x 1 is a query to g (resp., id), and by the normal form condition, x 1 is also present in V right before x 2 . Therefore, x 1 , x 2 are both in Q(V ), and thus x ∈ Q(V ). This time again the query x implies the event HIT hyb . B. If x 2 is a query asked to id (resp., e), then the root x 1 is a query to g (resp., id), and by the normal form condition, x 2 is asked also right after x which is of the form k (resp., d). The latter implies the event HIT hyb .
(c) If x is a free query for O (i.e., x ∈ O, so x ∈ L), but it is not a free query for O (i.e., x ∈ O): This case is symmetric to the previous case above and involves the bad event HIT att . (In the remaining case in which x is not a free query for both of O and O (i.e., x ∈ O, x ∈ O ), the answer to x comes from identical distributions in both experiments.)
2. Decrypting the Challenge Bit. Now suppose a query x is asked during the decryption of
Step 6, and Attack and Hybrid have proceeded identically so far (including the encryption of the challenge). A key point is that during the decryption, the oracle O might have different definitions in Attack and Hybrid (even if they proceed identically) because O in Attack does not have access to the view of the final encryption. Therefore, we use O att and O hyb to distinguish them. We also define the partial oracle O defined in both experiments as follows. At any time, O consists of Q(V ) ∪ L as well as the queries in the view of the final encryption and the decryption so far. Note that, in our parallel comparison, we also assume that the oracle O is identical across Attack and Hybrid so far. Below we discuss the different possible cases. i. If x ∈ O hyb : due to the details of this case, we continue this case below.
ii. If x ∈ O hyb :
A. If x ∈ O : In Hybrid, x is a free query because of x ∈ O hyb . In Attack, all the queries asked to O so far are included in O and so x ∈ O implies that x is a free query in Attack as well. Therefore x is a free query in both experiments and its answer is chosen from (t/s)-close distributions. B. If x ∈ O : The case study of this case is identical to Case 1b above.
Continuing Case 2(b)i:
Let x 1 and x 2 be the other two queries that make a triangle with x in O , and let x 1 be the root of the triangle and x 2 the dual query of x. Since this triangle does not exist in O att , at least one of x 1 and x 2 should be asked during the final encryption.
• If x 1 is asked during the final encryption:
-If x 2 ∈ Q(V ) \ L: In this case event MAL hyb has happened.
-If x 2 ∈ Q(V ) \ L: then in Attack both of x 1 , x 2 are asked to O. Since in Attack,
x is also forwarded to O, it follows that the same answer determined by the answers of x 1 , x 2 is used for x in both experiments Attack and Hybrid.
• If x 2 is asked during the final encryption:
-If x 1 ∈ Q(V ) \ L: In this case again in Attack all of x 1 , x 2 and x are asked to O and so the same answer determined by the answers of x 1 , x 2 is used for x in both experiments Attack and Hybrid. -If x 1 ∈ Q(V ) \ L: Let V * be the union of the views of the challenger during the generation of PK and DK * as specified in V , and let V j for j ∈ [k] be the challenger's view when generating DK j as specified in V . * If x 1 ∈ Q(V * ): Then x 1 should belong to Q(V j ) for some j ∈ [k], and so the event MAL hyb has happened. * If x 1 ∈ Q(V * ): Then x 2 can not be a k or d query, because these queries would make x 1 to be asked during the final encryption and that implies the event HIT att has happened. · If x 1 is of the form g(sk) = pk, then x 2 should be of the form id(pk, dk) = α, and x of the form k(sk, α) = dk. By the normal form condition x 1 is asked right before x, at which point (since x 1 ∈ Q(V * )) the event INT 1 hyb has happened. · If x 1 is of the form id(pk, dk) = α, then x 2 should be of the form e(pk, α, m) = c, and x of the form d(pk, dk, c) = m. By the normal form condition x 1 is asked right before x, at which point (since x 1 ∈ Q(V * )) the event INT 2 hyb has happened.
